The curse of rationality in sequential scheduling games by Chen, Cong & Xu, Yinfeng
The curse of rationality in sequential scheduling games
Cong Chen1 and Yinfeng Xu2
1 School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China
2 School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China
Abstract. Despite the emphases on computability issues in research of algorithmic game
theory, the limited computational capacity of players have received far less attention. This
work examines how different levels of players’ computational ability (or “rationality”)
impact the outcomes of sequential scheduling games. Surprisingly, our results show that
a lower level of rationality of players may lead to better equilibria.
More specifically, we characterize the sequential price of anarchy (SPoA) under two
different models of bounded rationality, namely, players with k-lookahead and simple-
minded players. The model in which players have k-lookahead interpolates between the
“perfect rationality” (k = n− 1) and “online greedy” (k = 0). Our results show that the
inefficiency of equilibria (SPoA) increases in k the degree of lookahead: SPoA = O(k2) for
two machines and SPoA = O
(
2k min{mk, n}
)
for m machines, where n is the number
of players. Moreover, when players are simple-minded, the SPoA is exactly m, which
coincides with the performance of “online greedy”.
Keywords: Scheduling game · Subgame-perfect equilibrium · Bounded rationality ·
Sequential price of anarchy
1 Introduction
Research on algorithmic game theory – a fascinating fusion of both game theory and algorithms
– has attracted a lot of computer scientists and economists. The core of this research field is
to take the computability (computational complexity) into consideration while studying game
theory problems, such as the complexity of finding Nash equilibria and the computational
issues in mechanism design. However, the computational ability of players has received little
attention from the community, despite its strong ties to computational complexity and the
actual behavior of players playing a game. Most research assumes the players always have the
ability to compute an optimal decision, even though sometimes finding an optimal decision is a
very difficult problem (e.g. NPC problem). Our work examines the impact of different levels of
computational ability (also termed as “rationality” in this paper) of players on the outcomes of
sequential scheduling games. Surprisingly, the results show that a lower level of rationality may
produce better equilibrium outcomes.
Sequential scheduling game (on unrelated machines). There are n jobs N = {1, 2, . . . , n} as
players and m machines M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} as strategies. Each job j will take pi,j units of time
if processed by machine i. The jobs sequentially choose one of the machines for processing,
starting with job 1 and ending with job n. The load of a machine is the total processing times
of the jobs processed on it. The goal of each job is to choose a machine with a smallest possible
load.
When a job makes decision, he knows the choices made by his predecessors as well as
the processing times of his successors. However, it is very hard for the job to compute an
optimal decision. Indeed, Leme et al. (2012) showed that for the unrelated machine scheduling
computing a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) is PSPACE-complete. One can glance at the
example shown in Table 1 to see how hard to find the optimal decision (in gray box) for job 1,
and how easily the job may deviate from his optimal choice (to choose machine 2 with a very
small processing time ) without enough computational ability.
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Table 1. An example from Giessler et al. (2016) with 5 jobs and 2 machines, where the SPE is shown
as gray boxes.
job 1 job 2 job 3 job 4 job 5
machine 1 3− 11   1− 2 2− 8
machine 2  2− 9 2− 8 1− 2 1− 2
Price of anarchy and the curse of rationality. The concept of the price of anarchy (PoA),
proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (2009) to assess the inefficiency of equilibria
outcomes, has attracted many research over the past two decades. To further understand the
quality of SPEs outcomes of a game, Leme et al. (2012) introduced the sequential price of
anarchy (SPoA). While the PoA compares the cost of a worst case Nash equilibrium to the
optimal social cost, the SPoA considers the outcomes of a sequential game where players,
instead of choosing their strategies simultaneously, choose their strategies sequentially in some
arbitrary order.
It turns out the PoA is very bad (unbounded) for even two unrelated machines, and
introducing sequentiality only slightly improves the outcomes – the SPoA grows linearly with
the number n of players (Giessler et al., 2016). However, when we look carefully at the worst
case scenario, which gives the lower bound of SPoA for two unrelated machines in Giessler
et al. (2016), we find that the equilibrium is very unnatural and can hardly be achieved in
reality, unless each player can solve a PSPACE-complete problem while making decision. The
example in Table 1 already reveals the phenomenon that the first two players have to make a
very complex computation to counter-intuitively choose a machine with a very high processing
time rather than the one with almost 0 processing time.
Perhaps surprisingly, instead of assuming all the players have such strong rationality, if
players are myopic (i.e., decisions are made only based on the predecessors’ decision), the SPoA
will be significantly improved to 2 for two unrelated machines, where the result can be deduced
from the online greedy scheduling problem (Aspnes et al., 1997). This result illustrates that full
rationality may have a negative effect on the quality of outcomes. Our work mainly investigates
the impact of different levels of rationality on the SPoA for the unrelated machines scheduling
game.
Modeling the bounded rationality. The notion of bounded rationality can be traced back to
the pioneering work of Simon (1955). Herbert Simon defines bounded rationality as “rational
choice that takes account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker – limitations of both
knowledge and computational capacity”. Frank Hahn remarks that “there is only one way to be
perfectly rational, while there are an infinity of ways to be partially rational...” (Lee, 2011).
Indeed, there are tons of literature tried to model the bounded rationality. We refer the readers
to some surveys (see, e.g., Velupillai (2010); Lee (2011); Di and Liu (2016)) for details.
This paper propose two ways to model the bounded rationality of players:
1. Players with k-lookahead. We suppose each player only considers the next few successors’
information for computing his decision, in addition to the known predecessors’ decisions.
We say a player has a k-lookahead ability if he can compute the optimal decision depending
on his next k successors’ information and the predecessors’ decisions. Specifically, when a
player makes decision, he will draw a (k+ 1)-level game tree (including the node of himself),
assign the corresponding costs to the leaves, and then perform backward induction to decide
which move to make. Similar setting can also be found in Mirrokni et al. (2012); Bilo` et al.
(2017); Groenland and Scha¨fer (2018); Kroer and Sandholm (2020).
2. Simple-minded players. As an extension, we also examine a situation where players make
decisions only via simple calculations. When a so-called simple-minded player makes decision,
he simply assumes the successors will choose machines with minimum processing times,
so he can easily find a best choice depending on the assumption. The setting is also very
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Table 2. A summary of results, some of which achieved in this paper are marked with “∗”
2 machines m machines
Online greedy (0-lookahead) 2 m
1-lookahead 2 ∗ O(m) ∗
k-lookahead O(k2) ∗ O
(
2k min{mk, n}
) ∗
Perfect rationality (n-lookahead) Θ(n) O(2n)
Simple-minded 2 ∗ m ∗
natural in the unrelated machine scheduling, since choosing a machine with minimum
processing time is mostly not a bad idea, and assuming other players doing so makes the
prediction of other players’ behaviors much simpler.
Our contributions. This paper mainly investigates how the degree of rationality impacts the
efficiency of SPEs. We characterize the SPoA under two different models of bounded rationality,
namely, players with k-lookahead and simple-minded players. In general, quantifying the SPoA
is a challenging task, and no general techniques are known in the literature. In this paper, the
key idea of most of our proofs is to characterize the amount of increase of the makespan or load
of machine due to an additional job or set of jobs. Out main results are as follows (see also
Table 2):
1. In Section 3, we first show that for sequential scheduling game on 2 unrelated machines the
SPoA is 2 for players with 1-lookahead, which coincides with the case of 0-lookahead – i.e.,
online greedy. This result perhaps suggests that the strategic behavior of only one player
foreseen does not bring any negative influence on the current decision-maker. However, we
will show in the following that the interaction of more than 2 players (i.e., 2-lookahead)
may have a negative effect on the decision being made.
2. For the players with k-lookahead, we obtain that SPoA = O(k2) for 2 unrelated machines.
This shows that the more lookahead the players have the worst the SPoA will be. But if
we compare this result to the “perfect rationality” case where the SPoA is Θ(n) (Giessler
et al., 2016), bounded rationality significantly improves the quality of SPEs. (These results
are presented in Section 4.)
3. We also characterize the SPoA for general m unrelated machines case. We prove that
SPoA = O
(
2k min{mk, n}) for players with k-lookahead, which also improves the O(2n)
upper bound for the perfect rationality case. (See Section 4.)
4. At last, another bounded rationality model where the players are simple-minded is discussed.
It turns out that if assuming all the predecessors follow a simple rule – choosing the machine
with minimum processing time – the player will make a decision as good as the online
greedy, that is, SPoA = m. (The results can be found in Section 5.)
Further related work. The idea of limited lookahead first appeared in the 1950s Shannon (1950).
Recently, the idea has been investigated in some game-theoretic setting by several research
(Mirrokni et al., 2012; Kroer and Sandholm, 2020; Bilo` et al., 2017; Groenland and Scha¨fer, 2018).
In particular, Bilo` et al. (2017) and Groenland and Scha¨fer (2018) have very similar setting to
our k-lookahead model. However, they both focused on the congestion games. Bilo` et al. (2017)
studied the existence of k-lookahead equilibria and the PoA for 2-lookahead (corresponding to
1-lookahead in our setting) equilibria in congestion games with linear latencies. Groenland and
Scha¨fer (2018) focused on the equilibria which are not only SPEs but also Nash equilibria. They
show that for generic simple congestion games the SPoA coincides with the PoA (independently
of k). In fact, both of the above work failed to reveal what the role of k plays in the game,
which is distinguished in the unrelated machines scheduling game by our work.
The SPoA for unrelated machines was first analyzed by Leme et al. (2012), showing that
n ≤ SPoA ≤ m · 2n. The bounds are improved to 2Ω(
√
n) ≤ SPoA ≤ 2n by Bilo` et al. (2015).
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However, the above lower bounds use a non-constant number of machines, which means it is still
unclear whether the lower bound is constant for constant number of machines. Giessler et al.
(2016) answered the question, showing that the SPoA is not constant for even two machines, that
is, SPoA = Ω(n). They also provided a matching upper bound, concluding that SPoA = Θ(n)
for two unrelated machines.
2 Preliminaries
We formally define the sequential scheduling game on unrelated machines and our two models
of bounded rationality – players with k-lookahead and simple-minded players.
Sequential scheduling game on unrelated machines. Let [a : b] = {a, a+ 1, . . . , b} and [b] = [1 : b]
where a, b ∈ N. Unrelated machine scheduling can be defined as a tuple (N,M, (pi,j)i∈N,j∈M ),
where N = [n] is the a set of jobs/players, M = [m] is the set of machines/strategies, and
pi,j is the processing time of job j on machine i. In sequential scheduling game, the jobs
sequentially choose one of the machines for processing, starting with job 1 and ending with job
n. A schedule σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) represents the decisions of the jobs, where σj is the machine
which job j chooses. The load Li(N) of a machine i in schedule σ of jobs N is the sum of the
processing times of all jobs who choose machine i, that is, Li(N) =
∑
j:σj=i pi,j . When job j
makes decision, he will try to minimize his own cost Lσj (N) – the load of machine he chooses –
taking into account all his predecessors and successors. The schedule σ is thus decided. This is
an extensive form game, and so it always possesses subgame-perfect equilibria, which can be
calculated by backward induction.
Figure 1 gives an example of 3 jobs, in which the “perfect rationality” part depicts the
game tree for this example. In this game, job 1 has to draw the whole tree, calculate the costs
at each of the 23 = 8 leaves, and find the best choice by backward induction. The following
jobs will also go through an associated subtree in a similarly fashion. The bold lines show the
subgame-perfect strategies, and the (unique) path from the root to the leaf corresponding to
the black circle is the equilibrium solution (i.e., the schedule is (2, 1, 1)).
Players with k-lookahead. In this model, we suppose each player can only foresee the next
k players. Let Kj = [j + 1 : j + k] be the lookahead set for job j, where |Kj | = k. When a
player makes decision, he needs to draw a (k + 1)-level game tree (consists of himself and the
successors Kj), calculate the costs for this tree (with only 2k leaves), and find the best choose
by backward induction.
The “1-lookahead” part in Figure 1 gives an example of 3 jobs when players have 1-lookahead.
In this game, job 1 only knows the information of the next job (i.e., job 2), and considers the
job as the last job. After job 1 makes decision by backward induction, job 2 will compute a
best choose according to job 1’s decision and the next job’s information. As shown in the figure,
the SPE for this example is (1, 2, 1).
Simple-minded players. Simple-minded players ignore the strategical behaviors of their succes-
sors, and simply assume the successors will choose machines with minimum processing times.
According to this, the players can directly calculate the load of each machine and find a best
one.
In Figure 1, the “simple-minded” part illustrates the decision process for each player. It
shows that each player just needs to calculate the costs for only 2 leaves, and selects one machine
with a lower cost. The resulting SPE for this example is (1, 1, 2).
Inefficiency of equilibria. The (social) cost of a schedule/equilibrium is often defined as the
makespan, the maximum load over all machines. To quantify the inefficiency of SPEs, Leme
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1
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2
2
2
3
3
1
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1 1
(3− 2, 3− 2, 3− 2)
(1 + , 1 + , 1)
(2− , 1, 2− )
(2, 2, 2)
machine 1
machine 2
job 1 job 2 job 3
2
2− 3
1− 
1
2− 3
1
Fig. 1. An example of 3 jobs and 2 machines.
et al. (2012) introduced the sequential price of anarchy (SPoA) which compares the worst SPE
with the optimal social cost:
SPoA = sup
J
Lmax(J)
OPT (J) ,
where J takes over all possible job sets, and OPT (J) is the makespan of the optimal schedule
(a schedule generated by a central authority to minimize the social cost, and is not necessary
an equilibrium) for jobs J .
For example, see the instance in Figure 1. The optimal schedule is (1, 1, 2) with a makespan
of 1 + . Since the SPE under perfect rationality is (2, 1, 1) with a makespan of 3− 4, the SPoA
for this example is 3 (taking → 0). However, when players have only 1-lookahead, the SPoA
is 2 (taking → 0). Surprisingly, the SPE generated by simple-minded players is exactly the
optimal schedule, that is, SPoA = 1.
Additional notation. We introduce a notation of initial load D = (D1, D2, . . . , Dm) on the ma-
chines, meaning the machines already have some initial load before the jobs playing a game. Thus,
Li(D, J) is the load of machine i after the set J of jobs play sequentially on the machines with a
initial load D, and Lmax(D, J) = maxi∈M Li(D, J) is the corresponding makespan. Notice that
when J = ∅, Lmax(D, ∅) = ‖D‖∞. Sometimes we use D(`) = (D1(`), D2(`), . . . , Dm(`)) to rep-
resent the load of each machine due to the first ` ∈ N jobs, where Di(`) =
∑
j∈{j|σj=i,1≤j≤`} pi,j
for i = 1, . . . ,m.
To denote the maximum possible increase of the makespan due to the set J of jobs for any
initial load D ∈ RM+ , we define:
∆L(J) = sup
D∈RM+
{Lmax(D, J)− ‖D‖∞} .
For each specific machine, we also define:
∆Li(D, J) = Li(D, J)− ‖D‖∞ .
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For simplicity, we let pj = mini∈M pi,j be the minimum processing time of job j, and xi,j
represent whether job j chooses machine i in the sequential game, i.e.,
xi,j =
{
1, if job j chooses machine i, that is, σj = i;
0, otherwise.
3 Players with 1-lookahead on two unrelated machines
In this section, we analyze the SPoA for two unrelated machine when players has 1-lookahead.
We first prove a main lemma showing that the makespan is bounded by the total minimum
processing time:
Lemma 1. Lmax(0, N) ≤
∑
j∈N pj.
Proof. Since Lmax(0, N) = ‖D(n)‖∞ by definition, we just prove that ‖D(n)‖∞ ≤
∑
j∈N pj .
First, we will define a set of {n0, n1, . . . , nu} where n` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} for ` = 0, 1, . . . , u and
nu = n. Then we prove a claim that ‖D(n`)‖∞ ≤
∑n`
j=1 pj for ` = 0, 1, . . . , u, which indicates
‖D(n)‖∞ ≤
∑
j∈N pj and proves this lemma.
For a given set N of jobs, their processing times pi,j and decisions xi,j in the sequential
game, we define a set of {n0, n1, . . . , nu} by Algorithm 1.
We next show that the two “while loops” in Algorithm 1 (Line 5 and 8) will end at some
v ≤ n. In other words, for example, if D1(v − 1) + p1,v ≤ D2(v − 1) + p2,v (the first “while
loop”), there must be some v′ (v ≤ v′ ≤ n) that x1,v′ = 1. We take the first “while loop” as an
example and the analysis for the second one is similar. When D1(v−1)+p1,v ≤ D2(v−1)+p2,v,
machine 1 is a better choice for player v regardless the decision of next player v + 1. If player
v chooses machine 1 (i.e., x1,v = 1), the loop ends. However, if player v chooses machine 2
(i.e., x1,v = 0), the only reason is that player v knows player v + 1 will choose machine 1 and
D1(v−1) +p1,v +p1,v+1 ≥ D2(v−1) +p2,v. What makes layer v believe player v+ 1 will choose
machine 1 is that D1(v − 1) + p1,v + p1,v+1 ≤ D2(v − 1) + p2,v+1. Therefore, for player v + 1
(after player v has made his/her decision), machine 1 is a better choice regardless the decision
of next player v + 2. Similarly, if player v + 1 chooses machine 2 (i.e., x1,v+1 = 0), it holds that
player v + 1 believes the next player v + 2 will also choose machine 1. In a similar fashion, we
know that if player v′′ chooses machine 2 (i.e., x1,v′′ = 0), player v′′ + 1 will choose machine 1
regardless the decision of next player v′′+ 2. Therefore, when player v′′+ 1 is the last player (i.e.
v′′ + 1 = n), player v′′ + 1 will surely choose machine 1 (i.e., x1,v′′+1 = 1) and the loop ends.
Given the set {n0, n1, . . . , nu} where n0 = 0 and nu = n, we claim that:
Claim. ‖D(n`)‖∞ ≤
∑n`
j=1 pj for ` = 0, 1, . . . , u.
Algorithm 1: Definition of {n0, n1, . . . , nu}
Input: pi,j and xi,j for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , n.
Output: {n0, n1, . . . , nu}.
1 u = 0; v = 1; D1(0) = 0; D2(0) = 0; n0 = 0;
2 Di(`) =
∑
1≤j≤` pi,j · xi,j for ` = 1, . . . , n and i = 1, 2;
3 while v ≤ n do
4 if D1(v − 1) + p1,v ≤ D2(v − 1) + p2,v then (nu is the next v that x1,v == 1)
5 while x1,v == 0 do v++;
6 u++; nu = v; v++;
7 else (nu is the next v that x2,v == 1)
8 while x2,v == 0 do v++;
9 u++; nu = v; v++;
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We prove the claim by induction on ` = 0, 1, . . . , u. The base case (` = 0) is trivial, since
‖D(0)‖∞ = 0 and
∑0
j=1 pj = 0. Assume ‖D(n`)‖∞ ≤
∑n`
j=1 pj holds for ` = v. We then prove
that
‖D(nv′)‖∞ ≤
nv′∑
j=1
pj , (1)
where v′ = v + 1. Since the first nv jobs create load D(nv) on the machines (with a makespan
‖D(nv)‖∞), we only need to show that the increment of makespan after the allocation of
job {nv + 1, nv + 2, . . . , nv′} is no greater than the total minimum processing times of jobs
{nv + 1, nv + 2, . . . , nv′}, namely,
‖D(nv′)‖∞ − ‖D(nv)‖∞ ≤
nv′∑
j=nv+1
pj .
Therefore, we focus on the subgame played by players {nv + 1, nv + 2, . . . , nv′}. Without loss
of generality, we consider the case D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 ≤ D2(nv) + p2,nv+1 (the proof for the
other case D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 > D2(nv) + p2,nv+1 is similar). According to Algorithm 1, jobs
{nv + 1, nv + 2, . . . , nv′ − 1} choose machine 2 and job nv′ chooses machine 1 (as shown in the
following Table 3 where gray boxes represent the choices). We know that
‖D(nv′)‖∞ = max
D1(nv) + p1,nv′ , D2(nv) +
nv′−1∑
j=nv+1
p2,j
 . (2)
Table 3. Decisions of jobs {nv + 1, nv + 2, . . . , nv′}
machine 1 D1(nv) p1,nv+1 p1,nv+2 . . . p1,nv′−1 p1,nv′
machine 2 D2(nv) p2,nv+1 p2,nv+2 . . . p2,nv′−1 p2,nv′
In this case (D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 ≤ D2(nv) + p2,nv+1), we first give a upper bound on
D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 prepared for the following proof. Since
D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 ≤ D2(nv) + p2,nv+1 ≤ max {D1(nv), D2(nv)}+ p2,nv+1
and
D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 ≤ max {D1(nv), D2(nv)}+ p1,nv+1 ,
we obtain that
D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 ≤ max {D1(nv), D2(nv)}+ min {p1,nv+1, p2,nv+1}
= ‖D(nv)‖∞ + pnv+1 . (3)
We then analyze properties that holds for the subgame. According to the decisions of players,
we know that for any n′ ∈ {nv +1, nv +2, . . . , nv′−1}, the reason why player n′ choose machine
2 is that he/she believes player n′ + 1 will choose machine 1 if he/she choose machine 1, i.e.,
D1(nv) + p1,n′ + p1,n′+1 ≤ D2(nv) +
n′−1∑
j=nv+1
p2,j + p2,n′+1 (4)
Thus, machine 2 is a better choice for player n′, i.e.,
D2(nv) +
n′∑
j=nv+1
p2,j ≤ D1(nv) + p1,n′ + p1,n′+1 . (5)
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Define a function
Φ(n′) = max
D1(nv) + p1,n′+1 , D2(nv) +
n′∑
j=nv+1
p2,j
 .
Due to (5), we have
Φ(n′) ≤ max {D1(nv) + p1,n′+1 , D1(nv) + p1,n′ + p1,n′+1}
= D1(nv) + p1,n′ + p1,n′+1 (6)
≤ max
D1(nv) + p1,n′ , D2(nv) +
n′−1∑
j=nv+1
p2,j
+ p1,n′+1 . (7)
Substituting (4) into (6) yields
Φ(n′) ≤ D2(nv) +
n′−1∑
j=nv+1
p2,j + p2,n′+1
≤ max
D1(nv) + p1,n′ , D2(nv) +
n′−1∑
j=nv+1
p2,j
+ p2,n′+1 . (8)
According to (7) and (8), we get a critical inequality of Φ(n′):
Φ(n′) ≤ max
D1(nv) + p1,n′ , D2(nv) +
n′−1∑
j=nv+1
p2,j
+ min {p1,n′+1, p2,n′+1} (9)
= Φ(n′ − 1) + pn′+1 .
Therefore, we obtain that
Φ(nv′ − 1) ≤ Φ(nv′ − 2) + pnv′ ≤ . . . ≤ Φ(nv + 1) +
nv′∑
j=nv+3
pj
where
Φ(nv + 1) ≤ max {D1(nv) + p1,nv+1 , D2(nv)}+ pnv+2 by inequality (9)
≤ max {‖D(nv)‖∞ + pnv+1 , D2(nv)}+ pnv+2 by inequality (3)
= ‖D(nv)‖∞ + pnv+1 + pnv+2 .
Therefore, it holds that
Φ(nv′ − 1) ≤ ‖D(nv)‖∞ +
nv′∑
j=nv+1
pj .
Since (2), we have
‖D(nv′)‖∞ = Φ(nv′ − 1) ≤ ‖D(nv)‖∞ +
nv′∑
j=nv+1
pj ,
which concludes the proof of Claim 9, and therefore the lemma is proved. uunionsq
Theorem 1. For the sequential scheduling game on two unrelated machines where players have
1-lookahead, SPoA = 2.
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Proof. According to Lemma 1 and an obvious lower bound on the optimal cost, namely
OPT (N) ≥∑j∈N pj/2, we obtain
SPoA = Lmax(0, N)
OPT (N) ≤
∑
j∈N pj∑
j∈N pj/2
= 2 .
We then introduce a game that shows SPoA ≥ 2. There are only two jobs in this game (as shown
in Table 4). The first job has processing times 1 +  and 1 on machines 1 and 2, respectively,
and the second job has processing times 2 and 1 +  on machines 1 and 2, respectively.
Table 4. A game of two players
job 1 job 2
machine 1 1 +  2
machine 2 1 1 + 
In this sequential game job 1 will choose machine 2, and thus job 2 will choose machine
1. The resulting makespan is 2. However, the optimal makespan is 1 + , where job 1 chooses
machine 1 and job 2 chooses machine 2. Therefore, we have SPoA ≥ 21+ . By taking → 0, we
obtain SPoA ≥ 2. uunionsq
4 Players with k-lookahead
This section focuses on the general case where players have k-lookahead. We first prove a key
lemma showing that each job can only contribute a certain amount to the makespan:
Lemma 2. ∆L([` : n]) ≤ ∆L([`+ 1 : n]) + p` +∆L(K`) for ` = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof. For ` ∈ [1 : n], given a job set [` : n] and an initial load vector D. We define two notations
regarding the decision of job `. One is the new initial load after job ` chooses machine i ∈M :
D˜i = D+ (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, pi,`, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−i
) .
The other one is the anticipated cost of job ` with a lookahead set K` if he/she chooses machine
i ∈M :
L˜i = Li(D˜i,K`) .
Without loss of generality, we suppose job ` chooses machine i∗. Thus, the makespan for
the game of the set [` : n] of players and the initial load D is
Lmax(D, [` : n]) = Lmax(D˜i∗ , [`+ 1 : n])
≤ ‖D˜i∗‖∞ +∆L([`+ 1 : n]) .
We first discuss a trivial case, where ‖D˜i∗‖∞ = ‖D‖∞, that is, ‖D‖∞ will not increase
after job ` chooses machine i∗. This case indicates that
Lmax(D, [` : n]) ≤ ‖D‖∞ +∆L([`+ 1 : n]) .
The lemma is proved, since the inequality holds for any D:
∆L([` : n]) = sup
{
Lmax(D, [` : n])− ‖D‖∞ : D ∈ RM+
}
≤ ∆L([`+ 1 : n]) .
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Then we discuss the case ‖D˜i∗‖∞ > ‖D‖∞. Because the increment of ‖D‖∞ is due to job
` chooses machine i∗, we know that ‖D˜i∗‖∞ = Di∗ + pi∗,`. This indicates that the anticipated
cost of job ` is at least ‖D˜i∗‖∞, i.e.,
L˜i∗ ≥ ‖D˜i∗‖∞ .
Let’s focus on the moment when job ` makes decision. Job ` knows the initial load D and
the lookahead set K`. Thus, the anticipated cost of job ` for choosing any machine i ∈M is
L˜i = Li(D˜i,K`) = ‖D˜i‖∞ +∆Li(D˜i,K`) .
Since job ` chooses machine i∗, it holds that
L˜i∗ ≤ min
i∈M
{
L˜i
}
= min
i∈M
{
‖D˜i‖∞ +∆Li(D˜i,K`)} ≤ min
i∈M
{
‖D˜i‖∞}+∆L(K`) .
According to the definition of D˜i, we know that
‖D˜i‖∞ ≤ ‖D‖∞ + pi,` .
Thus it holds that
L˜i∗ ≤ ‖D‖∞ + min
i∈M
{pi,`}+∆L(K`) = ‖D‖∞ + p` +∆L(K`) .
Since L˜i∗ ≥ ‖D˜i∗‖∞, it follows that
‖D˜i∗‖∞ ≤ ‖D‖∞ + p` +∆L(K`)
Therefore we have
Lmax(D, [` : n]) ≤ ‖D˜i∗‖∞ +∆L([`+ 1 : n])
≤ ‖D‖∞ + p` +∆L(K`) +∆L([`+ 1 : n]) .
Since the inequality holds for any D, we obtain
∆L([` : n]) = sup
{
Lmax(D, [` : n])− ‖D‖∞ : D ∈ RM+
}
≤ p` +∆L(K`) +∆L([`+ 1 : n]) ,
which completes the proof. uunionsq
Theorem 2. For the sequential scheduling game where players have k-lookahead, the SPoA is
at most O(k2) for the two unrelated machines case, and at most O(2k ·min{mk, n}) for the m
unrelated machines case.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, it follows that
∆L([1 : n]) ≤ ∆L([2 : n]) + p1 +∆L(K1) ≤ . . . ≤
n∑
j=1
pj +
n∑
j=1
∆L(Kj) . (10)
For the two unrelated machines case, we can know from Giessler et al. (2016, Theorem 4) that
∆L(Kj) ≤ (k − 1)
∑
j∈Kj
pj .
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So we have
∆L([1 : n]) ≤
n∑
j=1
pj +
n∑
j=1
∆L(Kj)
≤
n∑
j=1
pj + (k − 1)
∑
j∈K1
pj +
∑
j∈K2
pj + . . .+
∑
j∈Kn
pj

≤
n∑
j=1
pj + k(k − 1)
n∑
j=1
pj
≤ (k2 − k + 1)
n∑
j=1
pj .
Therefore, it holds that
SPoA ≤ ∆L(N)
OPT (N) ≤
(k2 − k + 1)∑nj=1 pj∑n
j=1 pj/2
= 2(k2 − k + 1) = O(k2) ,
for 2 unrelated machines.
As for the m unrelated machines case, according to Leme et al. (2012, Theorem 4) and Bilo`
et al. (2015, Theorem 5), we get two upper bounds for ∆L(Kj):
∆L(Kj) ≤ 2k
∑
j∈Kj
pj , (11)
∆L(Kj) ≤ 2k max
j∈Kj
pj . (12)
On one hand, by (10), (11) and OPT (N) ≥∑j∈N pj/m, we have
SPoA ≤ ∆L(N)
OPT (N)
≤
∑
j∈N pj +
∑
j∈N ∆L(Kj)∑
j∈N pj/m
≤
∑
j∈N pj + k2k
∑
j∈N pj∑
j∈N pj/m
= mk2k +m
= O(mk2k) .
On the other hand, by (10), (12) and OPT (N) ≥ maxj∈N pj , we have
SPoA ≤ ∆L(N)
OPT (N)
≤
∑
j∈N pj +
∑
j∈N ∆L(Kj)
OPT (N)
≤
∑
j∈N pj
OPT (N) +
n2k maxj∈N pj
OPT (N)
≤
∑
j∈N pj∑
j∈N pj/m
+ n2
k maxj∈N pj
maxj∈N pj
= m+ n2k
= O(n2k) .
Therefore, we obtain SPoA = O(2k ·min{mk, n}) for m unrelated machines. uunionsq
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5 Simple-minded players
A simple-minded player makes decision only via simple calculations. When a simple-minded
player j makes decision, job j will select a machine with minimum anticipated load assuming
that all the follow-up players will simply choose machines with minimum processing time. We
show in this section that the SPoA is exactly m, the number of machines.
Additional notation. For any job j and machine i, we define
Ai(j) = Di(j) + Pi([j + 1 : n]) ,
where Di(j) is the initial load of machine i due to the first j jobs, Pi([j + 1 : n]) is the total
processing time of the jobs who are assumed by job j to choose machine i (i.e. the jobs have
minimum processing time on machine i). Note that the definition of Pi(·) avoids the issue
caused by a tie, since a job can assume the follow-up players to choose only one machine.
Theorem 3. For the sequential scheduling game on m unrelated machines where players are
simple-minded, SPoA ≤ m.
Proof. We claim that Amax(`) ≤ Amax(`−1) for ` = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Amax(j) = maxi∈M Ai(j).
If the claim is true, we can obtainAmax(n) ≤ Amax(0). SinceAmax(n) = Lmax(0, N),
∑
j∈N Aj(0) =∑
j∈N pj (by definition) and OPT (N) ≥
∑
j∈N pj/m, it holds that
SPoA = Lmax(0, N)
OPT (N) =
Amax(n)
OPT (N) ≤
Amax(0)
OPT (N) ≤
∑
j∈N Aj(0)
OPT (N) ≤
∑
j∈N pj∑
j∈N pj/m
= m,
meaning the theorem holds.
We then prove the above claim. For an arbitrary `, we assume machine i∗ has the minimum
processing time for job `, i.e., p` = pi∗,`.
Case 1. If job ` chooses machine i∗, it follows that
Ai∗(`) = Di∗(`) + Pi∗([`+ 1 : n])
= Di∗(`− 1) + p` + Pi∗([`+ 1 : n])
= Di∗(`− 1) + Pi∗([` : n])
= Ai∗(`− 1) .
Since job ` chooses machine i∗, for any other machine i ∈M\{i∗}, the decision of job ` does
not change Ai(`− 1), that is, Ai(`) = Ai(`− 1). Therefore we have Amax(`) = Amax(`− 1).
Case 2. If job ` chooses machine i′ 6= i∗, this means machine i′ is a better choice than machine
i∗ for job `, i.e., Ai′(`) + pi′,` ≤ Ai∗(`).
For machine i∗, it holds that
Ai∗(`) = Di∗(`) + Pi∗([`+ 1 : n])
= Di∗(`− 1) + Pi∗([`+ 1 : n])
= Di∗(`− 1) + Pi∗([` : n])− p`
= Ai∗(`− 1)− p` .
Thus, we obtain that Ai′(`) ≤ Ai∗(`− 1) and Ai∗(`) ≤ Ai∗(`− 1). Since for any other machine
i ∈M\{i∗, i′}, the decision of job ` does not change Ai(`− 1) (i.e., Ai(`) = Ai(`− 1)), we have
Amax(`) ≤ Amax(`− 1).
The above two cases show that the claim is true, completing the proof. uunionsq
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Table 5. An instance for 4 machines
job 1 job 2 job 3 job 4
machine 1 1−  1−  1−  1− 
machine 2 4− 5 1 ∞ ∞
machine 3 ∞ 3− 4 1 ∞
machine 4 ∞ ∞ 2− 3 1
Theorem 4. For the sequential scheduling game on m unrelated machines where players are
simple-minded, SPoA ≥ m.
Proof. We first give an example in Table 5 to illustrate a game in which SPoA = m for m = 4.
To avoid breaking ties, we add  terms so that ties never occur. In the example, gray boxes
represent the choices of jobs and the optimal solution is given in bold. More specifically, job
1 thinks the follow-up jobs will choose machines with minimum processing time (i.e. jobs 2-3
will choose machine 1 with processing time 1− ). Thus machine 2 is the best choice for job
1, since the anticipated cost 4 − 4 of choosing machine 1 is higher than 4 − 5 of choosing
machine 2. Likewise, jobs 2 will choose machine 3, job 3 will choose machine 4, and the last job
4 will choose machine 1. The optimal solution is obviously that each job i chooses machine i.
Therefore, we can obtain SPoA = 4 by taking → 0.
For the general m machines case, we can provide an instance of m jobs in a similar fashion:
1. the processing time p1,j for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} on machine 1 is 1−  (also the minimum
processing time);
2. the processing time pj,j for job j ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m} on machine j is 1;
3. the processing time pj+1,j for job j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1} on machine j + 1 is m + 1 − j −
(m+ 2− j);
4. all the undefined processing times are ∞.
In this instance, the decisions of the jobs are: job j chooses machine j+1 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m−1,
and job m chooses machine 1, resulting a makespan of m − (m + 1). However, the optimal
makespan is 1 achieved by each job j chooses machine j. By taking  → 0, we can obtain
SPoA = m. Since we can find an instance that SPoA = m, it follows that the SPoA is at least
m. uunionsq
6 Conclusion
One of our main contributions to the area of algorithmic game theory is the reconsideration of
“perfect rationality” assumption for the players. This work helps, in some degree, to understand
why some games in reality perform much better than the theoretical prediction. As an example,
the inefficiency of the subgame-perfect equilibrium for scheduling game on two unrelated
machines is unbounded (for unbounded number of players). However it might not be so bad
in realty, since the real world players might only have bounded rationality. Our results just
explain this phenomenon in a theoretical way. We believe this work takes a promising step in
further understanding the role that bounded rationality plays in algorithmic game theory.
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